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Why are Greek tragedies so frequently revived and adapted on European 
stages? What makes them so popular? Attempts to answer this question 
have oten emphasized the alleged universality of the ‘classics’, their ability 
to survive and continue to be relevant through the ages. It has become a 
commonplace, for instance, to suggest that ‘if we want to understand the 
modern Western world, we need to look back to the Greeks’.1 Ironically, 
whilst I write this book in late 2012, these narratives of ‘origin’ overlap with 
anxieties about societal collapse, as Greece’s public debt seriously threatens 
the European Union and Eurozone. In the present study, I argue that the 
mythologies surrounding ‘classical’ Athens, as articulated and disseminated 
through theatre and performance, might illuminate how ‘we’, the people of 
Europe, imagine ourselves and negotiate our place in the world. he present 
study sets out to investigate these mythologies and assess their signiicance 
for theatre-makers, scholars and audiences alike.
In his book he Future of the ‘Classical’, Salvatore Settis examines 
Western cultural history through its successive ideological appropriations of 
Greco-Roman antiquity. Arguing that ‘classical’ values, as developed by the 
Greeks and mediated through the Romans, ‘have been used in the past few 
1 From the back cover of Charlotte Higgins, It’s All Greek to Me: From Homer to 
the Hippocratic Oath, How Ancient Greece Has Shaped Our World (London: Short 
Books, 2008). In this book, I am primarily concerned with Greek tragedy, and not 
comedy. his is, on the one hand, because tragedy is adapted and staged more oten 
than comedy. On the other, because tragedy is oten perceived as more ‘universal’ 
and more ‘archetypical’ than comedy. Tragedy is therefore more deeply entangled 
with the production of mythical narratives around ‘classical’ Greece than comedy.
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generations to legitimize the West’s hegemony over the rest of the world’, 
Settis analyses the mechanisms through which mainstream discourses con-
struct Greek history as universal, perpetuating an idea of ‘classical’ Greece 
as the mythical origin of Western civilization, oten underpinning concep-
tions of Western superiority.2 Such ahistorical appropriations of ancient 
Greek culture have functioned, and still function, as shared transnational 
myths throughout the West, particularly in Western Europe. In his study, 
Settis contrasts the static nature of the ‘classical’ as a crystallized past with 
the ‘dynamism of nostalgia or repetition’, seen as the ‘recurring obsession’, 
which periodically steers the West towards the need to resuscitate this 
past.3 His brief but compelling investigation exposes the politics of the 
‘classical’ and of fers insight into how Greek art came to be regarded as the 
‘essence’ of the West. Interrogating the cyclical ‘rebirths’ of the ‘classical’ in 
Western cultural history, Settis proposes that the West’s speciicity vis-à-
vis other civilizations lies precisely in the way it articulates its relationship 
to its own past. Although mythical narratives of death and rebirth of the 
world are typical of many cultures (Settis analyses Amerindian and Indian 
tales, but many more could be added to the list), what distinguishes the 
West in his view is a nostalgic cult of its own archaeological ruins and, cru-
cially, its construction of historical time as mythical time through a cult of 
‘classical’ heritage. his overlapping of mythical time and historical time 
has also informed methodological paradigms for historical scholarship, 
contributing to the ‘construction of a model for cultural history in terms 
of continuous, repeated and cyclical deaths and rebirths’.4 Seen from this 
perspective, Settis continues, the period known as the ‘Renaissance’ can be 
perceived as a ‘rebirth’ of ‘classical’ antiquity, along with the Carolingian 
renaissance, the Holy Roman Empire, Neoclassicism, and so on. Settis 
reminds us that this assimilation of myth and history is precisely what 
facilitates conceptions of Greek art as timeless, as opposed to culturally 
2 Salvatore Settis, he Future of the ‘Classical’, trans. Allan Cameron (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2006), p. 12.
3 Ibid., p. 16.
4 Ibid., p. 97. I am referring to works such as Jacob Burckhardt’s 1860 study, he 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).
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or historically determined: in other words, this is what makes it ‘classical’. 
In the cultural framework described by Settis, through the marginaliza-
tion of Classical Studies in education, dominant Western discourses turn 
‘classical’ cultural products into two-dimensional icons, allowing processes 
of de-historicization to take place. hese mechanisms, by which ‘classical’ 
Greece is imagined as ‘origin’ of the Western community, are inherently 
mythological, and it is crucial, therefore, that we examine them as such.5
In particular, this book investigates how mythical narratives around 
‘classical’ Greece are produced, reproduced and negotiated in the theatre 
through adaptations of Athenian tragedies. While Settis discusses ideologi-
cal appropriations of Greco-Roman history mainly through architecture 
and the visual arts, I believe the theatre is one of the key sites where such 
mythologies are disseminated in the twenty-irst century. By performing 
ancient drama as the ‘origin’ of Western theatre and the foundation of 
Western identity, theatre becomes a paradigmatic device for blurring the 
distinction between myth and history. As the spectators’ identiication 
with the performance is fostered through actualizations of ‘classical’ themes 
and the domestication of their foreignness, adaptations of Greek tragedy 
for a contemporary audience function as complex self-ref lexive rituals: 
while taking place here and now, they point to their half-mythical, half-
historical counterparts, namely open-air theatre festivals in ith-century 
Athens; while addressing themselves to contemporary audiences, they raise 
parallels between them and their ‘ancestors’, the alleged ‘inventors’ of thea-
tre. When reviving and adapting Greek tragedy, I suggest, performances 
simply cannot avoid evoking these mythologies, as they have become too 
widely inf luential across the West, particularly since the second half of the 
twentieth century. I believe, however, that it is possible to critique these 
mythologies through performance, though sadly this is not oten the case 
in contemporary productions. hroughout this study I will examine some 
of the ways in which narratives around ‘classical’ Athens and its theatre have 
provided key notions for Western identiication and self-deinition, specii-
cally in recent decades. As I will argue, questions concerning identity and 
5 For a deinition of the notion of myth, see pp. 16–23.
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community are oten at stake in contemporary stagings of Greek tragedy. 
By presenting ‘classical’ tragedy as ‘ours’, and by performing it in accord-
ance with familiar theatrical conventions, identiication mechanisms are 
fostered between audiences and the Greeks.
One of the central issues raised by performances of Greek tragedy 
in contemporary theatres is the idea of community. As Jean-Luc Nancy 
reminds us, Athenian drama today is seen as the ‘political (civil) presenta-
tion of the philosophical’ and the ‘philosophical presentation of the politi-
cal’: in other words, it appears to ‘us’ as the quintessential ‘presentation of 
being-together’, that is, of community.6 he tragic chorus, which in the 
ith century BC was a singing and dancing ensemble played by Athenian 
citizens, established a connection between the spectators gathered at the 
theatre and the heroes of mythology; it now articulates correspondences 
between itself and contemporary audiences, while also pointing to its half-
mythical, half-historical counterpart performed by the demos of Athenian 
democracy. Although it has become dif icult for contemporary audiences to 
see the Greek chorus as familiar for reasons which I will discuss in Chapter 
1, the collective igure remains an imagined presentation of a ‘democratic’ 
community which produces, by ref lecting and distorting, the congrega-
tion of spectators.
his book will therefore focus on theatrical problems around the 
notion of community as they emerge in modern and contemporary adap-
tations of Greek tragedies. Chapter 1 will investigate past and current 
approaches to the tragic chorus and the politics of af fective responses to 
the collective igure in the twentieth and twenty-irst centuries. By analys-
ing a selected number of key examples in the history of the chorus, I aim 
to demonstrate that the aesthetic and the political are simultaneously at 
play in the general ambivalence of contemporary audiences and theatre-
makers alike towards this implausible and unlikely device. I identify a major 
paradigm change in the understanding of the chorus in the beginning of 
the twentieth century – namely, the decline of unison – and investigate 
6 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. 
O’Byrne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 71.
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ideological and aesthetic reasons that might explain the shit towards frag-
mentation. I argue that capitalism’s ambiguous relationship with the notion 
of community, alongside its association with democratic ideology, inform 
contemporary attitudes to the collective character, prompting approaches 
that simultaneously af irm and deny the performability of the chorus. he 
myth that Western capitalist society, perceived as individualistic, is incom-
patible with community, and therefore with performances of the chorus, 
will be analysed for its nostalgic implications. While two recent adapta-
tions of Euripides’ Women of Troy, by Michel Vinaver (2003) and Mark 
Ravenhill (2008), will serve as the main case studies for my investigations 
into contemporary approaches to the chorus, I also discuss works by Katie 
Mitchell, Socìetas Raf faello Sanzio and Olivier Py.
By deinition, a community is a territory (not necessarily a physical 
one) characterized by familiarity, outside of which stand various degrees 
of otherness. In order to imagine itself and negotiate its place in the world, 
a community needs to establish material and immaterial boundaries that 
demarcate its inside from its outside. It is through acts of exclusion, there-
fore, that a community comes into being. Such imagined boundaries, which 
do not necessarily exist in the physical world, oten manifest themselves in 
visual cultures. his is why, in the ‘presentation of being-together’ that is 
Greek tragedy, what stands outside its imagined limits or, crucially, is imag-
ined to stand outside of them, is pivotal in assessing the kind of community 
implied through, and produced by, a performance. Drawing on aesthetic, 
moral and legal issues, Chapter 2 examines what is oten imagined to have 
been excluded from Greek tragic performances through a popular but false 
etymology of the word ‘obscene’, allegedly meaning ‘of fstage’. According 
to this derivation, the term ‘obscene’ originally referred to what was let 
of fstage by ‘classical’ tragedy, namely death and violence. he notion of 
the ‘obscene’ constitutes what stands outside, or is imagined to stand out-
side, a community’s ‘accepted standards’ of public visibility by virtue of its 
alleged potential to disrupt the community’s cohesiveness. I investigate the 
false etymology and the beliefs it has produced as articulating puritanical 
anxieties about propriety, which comment on the visual exclusions of our 
own aesthetic regime, rather than of fering any insight into ith-century 
Greek theatre. A comparative study of intertextual adaptations of the myth 
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of Phaedra will underpin my investigation into the limits of representa-
tion, while Socìetas Raf faello Sanzio’s Purgatorio (2009) and Krzysztof 
Warlikowski’s (A)pollonia (2009) will be analysed in relation to their treat-
ment of ‘obscenity’ and the management of the visual ield.
Chapter 3 examines the myth of the simultaneous birth of theatre and 
‘democracy’ and its implications for contemporary performance. More 
speciically, the chapter focuses on how ideological constructions of the 
audience of Greek tragedy, seen as the participating demos of ‘democracy’, 
are played out in contemporary adaptations of Greek tragedy. hrough a 
comparative analysis of recent adaptations of Aeschylus’ he Persians by 
Peter Sellars (1993), Dimiter Gotschef f (2006), Calixto Bieito (2008) and 
Rimini Protokoll (2008), I will argue that the idea of the theatre audience 
as an essentially ‘democratic’ community reinforces the current polarization 
of a ‘free’ West versus a ‘totalitarian’ East. he emphasis on the ‘democratic’ 
nature of Greek theatre suggests an appropriation of ‘classical’ tragedy by 
neoliberal discourses in an attempt to deine the West in terms of individual 
freedom, empowerment and participation, which retrospectively elevate 
Athenian democracy as a model for our current political system, despite 
its exclusion of women, foreigners and slaves.
West, Europe and Western Europe
he geopolitical entity usually referred to as ‘the West’ is a shiting notion 
whose homogeneity is largely imagined and ideologically constructed.7 
he United States and Europe, usually perceived as forming the core of 
the ‘Western community’, are themselves internally constituted by irre-
ducible dif ferences and heterogeneity. his study will focus on some of 
7 For the concept of ‘imagined political community’, which informs my thinking in 
this area, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, revized edn (London: 
Verso, 2006).
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the narratives that enable the idea of a transnational European (and, by 
extension, Western) community, which by no means coincides with what 
is understood as the European Union, to circulate in public-sphere dis-
courses and produce subjective identities. I will speculate on the ways in 
which performances of Greek tragedy enable generic concepts of Western 
identity to be disseminated and perpetuated transnationally on European 
stages, speciically in Western Europe. I will argue that, since the second 
half of the twentieth century, ‘classical’ Greece has provided a myth of 
‘origin’ in relation to which European ‘democracies’ deine themselves 
and reinforce their identity on the international and global stage. While I 
do not wish to suggest that appropriations of ancient Greece are a specii-
cally European phenomenon, I speculate on the ways in which the myth 
of ‘classical’ Athens works in conjunction with how European identity is 
imagined in the context of Europe’s political and economic uniication in 
the twentieth and twenty-irst centuries. herefore, the notions of Europe 
and West will be discussed primarily as imaginary constructions, rather than 
in their historical and socio-political complexity, because mythological 
thinking does not allow for subtle distinctions to be made.
As the uninished project of the European Union is yet again set to 
renegotiate its physical and imaginary boundaries following the Eurozone 
crisis, the desire for a shared European future is constantly counterbal-
anced by centrifugal forces and an emphasis on the irreducible dif ferences 
between member states and their interests. he opening-up of trade, job 
markets and frontiers, as well as monetary uniication, the creation of the 
European Parliament and the negotiation of the European Constitution 
have sought to promote, but have largely failed to achieve, mechanisms 
through which the general public might identify with European institu-
tions. On many occasions, the European project has struggled to capture 
the hearts and minds of the European people, who have felt alienated 
from a distant, unaccountable and hostile political machine. However, 
the dream of peaceful cooperation between European peoples rests on the 
possibility of negotiating a cultural common ground where transnational 
identiications can co-exist with national identities. Although the idea 
of a shared cultural background for European peoples remains a politi-
cal project more than a historical reality, Athenian mythologies have the 
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potential to attenuate national distinctions, themselves products of essen-
tialist myths about nation. But can the ‘classical’ ever become a basis, to 
borrow Nancy’s words, for our ‘being-in-common – precisely inasmuch 
as being-in-common is not a common being’?8
In his 1935 Vienna lecture entitled ‘Philosophy and the Crisis of 
European Humanity’, Edmund Husserl argued that the essence of the 
‘European Man’ could be found in the emergence of philosophy and sci-
ences in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries BC:
Spiritually Europe has a birthplace. By this I do not mean a geographical place, in 
some one land, though this too is true. I refer, rather, to a spiritual birthplace in a 
nation or in certain men or groups of men belonging to this nation. It is the ancient 
Greek nation in the seventh and sixth centuries BC. In it there grows up a new kind of 
attitude of individuals toward their environing world. Consequent upon this emerges 
a completely new type of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a systematically 
rounded cultural form that the Greeks called philosophy. Correctly translated, in 
its original sense, this bespeaks nothing but universal science, science of the world 
as a whole, of the universal unity of all being. Very soon the interest in the totality 
and, by the same token, the question regarding the all-embracing becoming and the 
resulting being begin to particularize themselves in accord with the general forms 
and regions of being. hus philosophy, the one science, is ramiied into the various 
particular sciences. In the emergence of philosophy in this sense, a sense, that is, 
which includes all sciences, I see – no matter how paradoxical this may seem – the 
original phenomenon of spiritual Europe.9
Husserl’s essentialist vision of Europe, which included the United States but 
excluded, for example, Roma populations, persists today in the imaginary 
life of contemporary Europeans; interestingly, however, today’s empha-
sis has shited towards the sixth and the ith centuries BC, that is, from 
8 Nancy, he Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor et al. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 29 and passim.
9 Edmund Husserl, ‘Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity’, lecture delivered 
in Vienna, 10 May 1935, originally published in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology 
and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 
1965), pp. 149–92 (pp. 158–59); also available online at <http://www.users.cloud9.
net/~bradmcc/husserl_philcris.html> [accessed 4 May 2010].
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the birth of philosophy to the birth of ‘democracy’.10 he insistence on a 
shared European heritage dating back to Greco-Roman antiquity ef fectively 
proposes to forget more than 2,500 years of cultural, religious and politi-
cal conf licts among European peoples, marginalizing alternative ways of 
imagining Europe, and imposing a hegemonic narrative on all European 
minorities. heatre plays a key role in perpetuating these mythologies; 
it is a place where the notions of ‘Europe’ and ‘West’ can be collectively 
imagined and disseminated, either challenging or reinforcing dominant 
discourses. A desire to revive an imagined European identity through its 
‘foundations’ might be considered as a cultural response to the processes 
of uniication and democratization throughout the continent and, more 
recently, to the so-called ‘age of uncertainty’.11 While Europe’s and the 
Western world’s economic, political and cultural hegemony are being chal-
lenged by a multiplicity of increasingly inf luential others (such as Islamic 
states and organizations, but also China, Russia and India), anxieties about 
the future consolidate self-legitimizing narratives. Today the idea of Europe, 
irst conceived by the Greeks as the land of freedom and self-determination 
in opposition to Asia, the land of slavish ‘barbarians’ (see Chapter 3), is 
reborn as a confederation of liberal democracies whose Eastern other still 
constitutes its ‘obscene’ territory.
Modern and contemporary performances of ‘classical’ texts, such 
as the plays of Shakespeare or Ibsen, have contributed to establishing a 
10 See Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, pp. 155–56, where 
he writes: ‘We may ask, “How is the spiritual image of Europe to be characterized?” 
his does not mean Europe geographically, as it appears on maps, as though European 
man were to be in this way conined to the circle of those who live together in this 
territory. In the spiritual sense it is clear that to Europe belong the English domin-
ions, the United States, etc., but not, however, the Eskimos or Indians of the country 
fairs, or the Gypsies, who are constantly wandering about Europe. Clearly the title 
Europe designates the unity of a spiritual life and a creative activity – with all its 
aims, interests, cares and troubles, with its plans, its establishments, its institutions.’
11 For this phrase, see Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007). By his deinition of the period, although he does not give 
precise dates, the ‘age of uncertainty’ began in the last few decades of the twentieth 
century and is still relevant into the 2000s.
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repertoire in which the European community, if there is one, might rec-
ognize itself. But what makes a Greek tragedy captivating in a speciic way 
is that it functions not simply as one of many European canonical texts; 
its half-mythical, half-historical status reaches us as an emblem of shared 
‘origin’ for European peoples that has no parallels, except for the Bible. 
As Settis has argued, ‘classical’ Greek values such as beauty and balance 
have been perpetuated through modernity as pre-ideological universals, 
not as historically determined principles. hrough the mythologies asso-
ciated with Greek tragedy, it is ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘participation’ 
that are constructed as timeless, simply the sine qua non of Western civili-
zation.12 While providing a platform for the creation of a strong cultural 
identity for an imagined ‘European community’, the de-ideologization and 
de-historicization of Greek tragedy and Athenian democracy underpin 
narratives of cultural superiority that oten end up reinforcing and legiti-
mizing the status quo. his happens, speciically, when Greek theatre is 
domesticated and appropriated as ‘our own’, which obscures its historical 
distance and cultural otherness vis-à-vis contemporary Western society.13 
When adaptations make Greek tragedy’s foreignness ‘accessible’ to con-
temporary audiences, the historical and cultural distance separating ‘us’ 
from ‘classical’ Athenians seemingly disappears; actualization, therefore, 
deceives contemporary spectators into the belief that ‘we’ really came out 
of Athens. If Greek tragedy is subsumed into the logic of familiar dramatic 
conventions, if the Greek stories about the Trojan and Persian wars, their 
accounts of the conf licts between individual will and destiny, their moral 
dilemmas and symbolic systems, are adapted to speak of ‘our’ wars, ‘our’ 
12 Settis, he Future of the ‘Classical’, pp. 100–1.
13 For the term ‘domesticating’, I am indebted to Lawrence Venuti’s thinking about 
literary translation. Venuti writes: ‘the aim of translation is to bring back a cultural 
other as the same, the recognizable, even the familiar; and this aim always risks a 
wholesale domestication of the foreign text, oten in highly self-conscious projects, 
where translation serves an appropriation of foreign cultures for domestic agen-
das, cultural, economic, political’. Lawrence Venuti, he Translator’s Invisibility: A 
History of Translation (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 18. See also idem, he Scandals 
of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Dif ference (London: Routledge, 1998).
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conf licts, ‘our’ dilemmas, the implied suggestion is that ‘we, Europeans’ are 
fundamentally like ith-century Athenians; but the reality is that we like to 
imagine ourselves to be. Crucially, however, the foreignness of the chorus 
always raises aesthetic and political problems for contemporary adaptors, 
presenting itself as the residue of an irreducible alterity (see Chapter 1).
In the course of this book, I suggest that there is a fundamental con-
nection between the establishment of liberal democracy as a dominant 
political and economic system in Europe and a renewed interest in Greek 
drama. Although the rise of democratic ideology in Europe in the second 
half of the twentieth century is linked to the project of uniication, the 
proliferation of mythologies transcends the geographical borders of the 
political and economic community, the expansion of which has continued 
from the 1950s well into the twenty-irst century. he idea of an intrinsic 
European culture and thought as distinct from that of other continents 
by far precedes the birth of the European Union. However, the notion of 
democracy only began to be associated with the project of a uniied Europe 
ater the end of World War II. When the United States’ Marshall Plan was 
agreed to sustain economic prosperity in Western Europe and contain the 
rise of communism, ef fectively prompting the establishment of free-trade 
market economies and liberal governments, the ‘American dream’ and its 
values spread across the region. In the 1950s, when the irst political deci-
sions were taken to establish economic cooperation between Western 
European states, Eastern European countries refused the US aid package 
under Stalin’s pressure and were eventually colonized by Russia.14 As Tony 
Judt has argued, ‘the [Marshall] Plan itself did not contribute by its design 
to the deinitive drawing of Cold War lines in Europe, but its timing and 
implementation served to accentuate the signiicance of the divisions at 
a crucial moment.’15 During the Cold War, then, Eastern European coun-
14 he European Coal and Steel Community was negotiated in 1950 between Germany 
and France. he European Economic Community was founded in 1958. For an intro-
duction to the history of the Europe, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe 
Since 1945 (London: Heinemann, 2005).
15 Tony Judt, ‘Introduction’, in Martin Schain, ed., he Marshall Plan: Fity Years Ater 
(New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 1–9 (p. 5).
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tries did not of icially embrace democratic ideology and its narratives of 
‘origin’; however, stagings of Greek tragedy were not rare, and the ‘classi-
cal’ tradition was well established. Although exploring the ways in which 
Eastern European theatre-makers and audiences appropriated the ‘classics’ 
might make an interesting line of enquiry, in mapping the central motifs of 
the book, I have chosen to focus mainly on Western Europe, an imagined 
territory deined precisely by the hegemony of democratic mythologies.16
Athenian, Liberal and Radical Democracy
Many have noted how misleading conf luences of historical and imaginary 
practices inform and multiply the meanings of the notion of democracy 
(from the Greek demokratia, people power). Stratiications and complica-
tions are highlighted, for instance, by Raymond Williams, who of fers a brief 
critique of the concept and links its f luctuating uses and indeterminacy 
with the vast array of interpretations given to the idea of ‘people power’.17 
Williams examines the distinctions between direct and representative 
democracy, and between the socialist and liberal democratic traditions, 
which gave rise to profoundly disparate understandings of popular sov-
ereignty. It is not my intention here to discuss the details of Athenian 
democracy in the ith century BC, nor to contrast them to representative 
democracy in the liberal Western world.18 As I shall note in Chapter 3, asso-
16 For a study of the ‘classical’ tradition in Central and Eastern Europe, see Craig 
Kallendorf, ed., A Companion to the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 
pp. 132–55. See also Lorna Hardwick, ‘Ancient Greek Drama on the Modern European 
Stage: Identities and Performance’, in Cristina Chimisso, ed., Exploring European 
Identities (Milton Keynes: Open University Worldwide, 2003), pp. 263–310.
17 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana 
Press, 1988), pp. 93–98.
18 For an examination of democracy in ancient Athens, see John Peter Rhodes, ed., 
Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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ciations between two distinct political systems have been actively pursued, 
sometimes with teleological undertones.19 However, it will be useful at this 
stage to outline some of the key elements in ‘classical’ Athenian democracy 
that have captured the Western liberal imagination. Coventionally, scholars 
credit Cleisthenes, an aristocratic leader of the city, with the ‘invention’ 
of what was then known as isonomía (equality before the law): democ-
racy, in fact, was a pejorative term coined by Greek critics of the system. 
Cleisthenes’ constitutional reform in 508–7 BC reorganized the admin-
istrative divisions of the Athenian population based on the geographical 
area of residence (the deme) rather than, as previously, on family relations, 
and simultaneously established more egalitarian regulations, based on the 
demes, for accessing the boulé, the legislative body charged with proposing 
new laws to the ekklesía, the assembly of Athenian citizens. his meant 
that the right to participate in legal procedures was more fairly distributed 
among male Athenians. Later reforms by Ephialtes and Pericles during the 
ith century perfected the early democratic system: the areopagus (the 
aristocratic assembly of elders) was gradually stripped of its dominance, 
and participation in public bodies such as the ekklesía became inancially 
retributed, so that not only the rich could af ford to take part. Athenian 
democracy is oten contrasted with liberal democracy because most of its 
of ices were assigned by lot, and laws were voted directly by the citizens 
gathered in the assembly, rather than by an elected parliament entrusted 
with power by representation. However, in ‘classical’ Athens, only adult 
male citizens whose parents were both Athenians enjoyed full political 
rights; women, foreigners and slaves were of course excluded from poli-
tics, and the poor ef fectively had no access to inf luential elected of ices, 
such as that of strategós (army general), which still favoured aristocratic 
igures such as Pericles. Ater the loss of independence to the Macedons 
in 338 BC, Greek city states, along with the Athenian democratic system, 
were ef fectively subdued to foreign monarchic rule, although Athens was 
allowed to nominally keep its institutions in place for several centuries, 
even under the irst period of Roman domination.
19 See Chapter 3, pp. 215–33.
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Athens’ egalitarian reforms, albeit with their fundamental exclusions 
and the relics of an aristocratic society, remained, for more than two mil-
lennia, isolated experiments in the direct participation in power by citi-
zens. But their signiicance acquired greater importance in modern times, 
when egalitarian ideologies began to spread among the middle-classes in 
North America and Europe in conjunction with the consolidation and 
radicalization of liberal capitalism.20 Although a representational system 
with professional politicians and an elected government had replaced a 
popular assembly and the participation of citizens chosen by lot, the name 
chosen to refer to the modern practice, ‘democracy’, was the same that 
Plato and Aristotle had used for the ancient Athenian mode of govern-
ment. While, on one level, the abolition of slavery and the extension of full 
political rights to women, including access to the highest public of ices, 
make modern democratic systems more egalitarian than that in ancient 
Athens, the direct involvement of ordinary citizens in day-to-day admin-
istration can be regarded as a more wholesome, less compromised version 
of popular sovereignty. Both systems, however, present considerable f laws; 
paradoxically, their practical mechanisms pervert the simple promise of 
equality from which they derive their legitimacy. Representative democracy, 
speciically, with the restriction of the people’s participation in politics to 
general and local elections, clearly lends itself to distortions of what should 
be, by etymological deinition, the rule of the people.
One of the central concerns of this book is the confusion generated by 
misleading mythologies that construct democracy in Athens as the ‘origin’ 
and model for contemporary practices. On several occasions, I have chosen 
to place the term democracy between inverted commas to signal that it is 
being used generically and confusingly, oten with the aim of legitimizing 
the current hegemonic understanding of democracy, that is, liberal repre-
sentative democracy, through the use of misrepresentations that idealize 
‘democratic’ Athens and its theatre festivals. herefore, I sometimes refer 
to Athenian democracy and liberal democracy as historical practices, but 
I primarily discuss the myth of ‘democratic’ Athens as a discourse that 
20 his is a slow and non-linear process, the beginning of which roughly coincides with 
the period known as Enlightenment.
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de-historicizes and distorts the relationship between language and its ref-
erent. he mythologizing mechanism is twofold: on the one hand, there is 
the confusion instilled by the idealization of ith-century BC Athens as the 
Golden Age of unadulterated popular sovereignty; on the other, there is the 
demagogic pretence that, in deriving from Athenian forms, contemporary 
liberal democracy should be considered as legitimate and just as its ‘classical’ 
counterpart. Evidently, these mythologies aim to present the current order 
as the fairest possible system, but the growing number of protests held in the 
name of more radically ‘democratic’ forms of government, especially since 
the inancial crisis of 2008, signals a dissatisfaction of the general public, 
not only in the West, with the paradox of the ‘democratic’ promise in the 
representative, liberal-conservative tradition. Protests have also highlighted 
discontent vis-à-vis the increasingly oppressive, authoritarian, neoliberal 
and military stance that Western democratic governments have adopted 
in recent decades, heralding what has been called a ‘post-democratic’ era.21 
In using inverted commas, I therefore also acknowledge the discrepancy 
between the compromised practice of capitalist democracy and the radi-
cal ideal of ‘people power’ demagogically promised to the public but, as 
Jacques Rancière has noted, actually feared by the ruling classes and the 
markets.22 On the Let, the post-Marxist tradition has elaborated several 
propositions for a more consistently egalitarian system that would incor-
porate, rather than suppress, dif ferences and antagonisms in its day-to-day 
processes; since 1985, Laclau and Mouf fe’s notion of radical democracy 
has been inf luential in this regard.23 he proliferation of struggles in the 
name of democracy in recent years, from the Arab Spring to the Occupy 
movement, of fers new hope that the impoverished notion of democracy 
under the liberal tradition will one day be held accountable for its failures; 
precisely, for reproducing hierarchies and inequalities under the banner of 
social justice, and for limiting popular sovereignty to the right to opt for or 
21 For a discussion of the notion of post-democracy, see Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
22 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London; New York: Verso, 2006).
23 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouf fe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).
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against pre-packaged programmes that are rarely accomplished by the end 
of a mandate. hese struggles also provide some optimism that a renewed 
democratic impetus might make a fairer system thinkable and practicable. 
heatre and performance, from the theatricality of street protests to that 
of professional stages, have an important role to play in this process. As 
Tony Fisher has argued in a recent article, the strategic aim of a radical 
democratic theatre should not be that of re-enacting an alleged ‘original’ 
theatre, as though the essence of theatre was ‘democracy’ itself, but that 
of practising ‘arraignment of power’ – that is, irstly, ‘calling into question 
the multiple operations of power that constitute the determinate situation 
of subjection through which subjects are interpellated’ by ‘stag[ing] the 
encounter between subjects and the condition of their subjection’; and 
secondly, ‘indict[ing] a determinate situation of subjection’ by challeng-
ing the belief system upon which rest current power relations.24 Exposing, 
challenging and resisting the proliferation of ahistorical mythologies about 
‘classical’ Athens and its relationship to the contemporary Western world 
is, I suggest, one possible step in this direction.
Myth, Community and the Myth of Community
he notion of myth (or mythology) is key to the understanding of com-
munity. Every community has its own myths, which enable mechanisms 
of cultural identiication and a degree of social cohesion to take place. he 
term myth can be used to refer to a kind of public-sphere discourse that is 
recurrent in a given society, and that oten conceals and distorts reality for 
ideological purposes, usually reinforcing the status quo. For example, two of 
the contemporary Western myths at stake in the context of this discussion 
are the notions of freedom and democracy, in relation to which the West 
24 Tony Fisher, ‘Radical Democratic heatre’, Performance Research, 16.4 (2011), 15–26 
(p. 12).
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likes to deine itself. Both Greek mythology and modern mythologies are 
narrative systems which produce, support and validate social customs and 
cultural beliefs. Roland Barthes deines myth as ‘a type of speech’ – that 
is, a ‘mode of signiication’.25 More precisely, he sees it as a ‘second-order 
semiological system’, a metalanguage, because it rests on the system of 
the language-object (that is, either a spoken language or the language of 
painting, photography, advertising, ilm, theatre and so on).26 Crucially, 
Barthes describes myth as ‘de-politicized speech’ which deforms meanings 
and deprives them of their historical dimension by naturalizing them.27 For 
Barthes, myth is the process through which bourgeois ideology ‘transforms 
the reality of the world into an image of the world, History into Nature’, 
so that mythical discourses appear to be referring to ‘natural’ facts, not 
debatable values.28 Barthes therefore notes that mythologies constitute a 
‘semiological system which has the pretension of transcending itself to a 
factual system’.29 his process of mythologization, ef fectively a loss of his-
toricity, is one of the main concerns of this project.
Barthes’s argument is echoed by Settis’ thesis, already discussed above, 
that Western narratives of cyclical death and rebirth transform history into 
myth. According to both thinkers, myth empties reality of the material, 
cultural and historical conditions which enabled it, turning complex and 
contradictory processes into essences, universalisms and hierarchies ready 
to be consumed. Myth is thus an ideological device which ‘interpellates’ 
subjects and enables mechanisms of identiication, in order to produce a 
certain image of reality and support a given power system.30 By constructing 
25 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 
p. 109. Barthes uses the terms ‘myth’ (mythe) and ‘mythology’ (mythologie) as near 
synonyms, but ‘myth’ is more oten used to refer to the ideological and discursive 






30 Ibid., p. 125. For the notion of interpellation, see Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology, 
trans. B. Brewster and G. Lock (London: Verso, 1984), pp. 44–51.
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imagined essences, mythologies support visions of identity as immanent, 
that is as having a fundamental principle in itself. he myth of community, 
for instance, has historically been associated with immanent conceptions 
of identity, as in the Nazi idea of race, or the nineteenth-century notion 
of nation. he issue with which this book is concerned is precisely the 
way in which mythologies around ‘classical’ Athens support identiication 
with an imagined ‘essence’ of Europe. Of course, not every production of 
Greek tragedy perpetuates the European myth of ‘origin’, but these nar-
ratives cannot be simply dismissed, and theatre-makers should be aware 
of their ef fects.
hroughout my study, the works of Jean-Luc Nancy will provide a 
theoretical point of reference for articulating the relationship of myth 
to community. In his essay ‘Myth Interrupted’, Nancy argues that there 
is no community outside of myth; that is there is no ‘being-in-common’ 
without a story with which the community can identify itself as such.31 
He evokes the image of the storyteller, around whom gather the members 
of a fraternity, as the foundational moment of community, the moment in 
which social identity is produced through performance:
It is an ancient, immemorial scene, and it does not take place just once, but repeats 
itself indeinitely, with regularity, at every gathering of the hordes, who come to 
learn of their tribal origins, of their origins in brotherhoods, in peoples, or in cities 
– gathered around ires burning everywhere in the mists of time. And we do not yet 
know if the ires are lit to warm the people, to keep away wild beasts, to cook food, 
or to light up the face of the narrator so that he can be seen as he speaks, sings or 
mimes the story (perhaps wearing a mask), or else to burn a sacriice (perhaps with 
his own f lesh) in honor of the ancestors, gods, beasts or men and women celebrated 
in the story.
 he story oten seems confused, it is not always coherent; it speaks of strange 
powers and numerous metamorphoses; it is also cruel, savage, and pitiless, but at 
times it also provokes laughter. It names things unknown, beings never seen. But 
those who have gathered together understand everything, in listening they under-
stand themselves and the world, and they understand why it was necessary for them 
to come together, and why it was necessary that this be recounted to them.32
31 Nancy, he Inoperative Community, p. 57.
32 Ibid., p. 44.
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Nancy goes on to describe this scene as ‘perhaps the essential scene of all 
scenes, of all scenography or all staging; it is perhaps the stage upon which 
we represent everything to ourselves’.33 But while myth enables and pro-
duces community, it also unveils its deceit, because myths are misleading 
impostures: they are mere representations through which we understand 
the world. he scene of the storyteller is, therefore, itself mythic. Nancy 
warns, however, that the invention of myth is inextricable from power. 
Speaking of the mechanism on which the Nazi myth was based, he states:
Concentrated within the idea of myth is perhaps the entire pretension on the part 
of the West to appropriate its own origin, to take away its secret, so that at last it can 
identify itself, absolutely, around its own pronouncement and its own birth. he idea 
of myth alone perhaps presents the Idea of the West, with its perpetual representa-
tion of the compulsion to return to its own sources in order to re-engender itself 
from them as the very destiny of humanity.34
With due mindfulness, Nancy’s analysis can be usefully employed to under-
stand the signiicance of performing ancient Greek drama for modern 
audiences. What is at stake in staging ‘classical’ Athenian tragedy is pre-
cisely what Nancy called the ‘Idea of the West’, the desire of the West to 
be perpetually regenerated through returning to its ‘origins’, understood as 
the universal ‘destiny of humanity’. For centuries, the emergence of Greek 
tragedy in Athens has been conceptualized as the birth of Western theatre 
and associated to the original myth of Western civilization. Re-enacting 
this myth, re-appropriating its signiicance, immediately creates an idea of 
community – that is, a Western community, which can identify itself with 
the myth of its own ‘origin’. Later in the same essay, Nancy suggests that 
the post-modern community constitutes itself on the basis of the absence 
of myth, which is itself a myth. Despite warning against nostalgia, Nancy 
nonetheless conceptualizes his time in terms of loss. He sees the early 1980s 
as a historical period where people no longer believe in myths, except for 
the ‘myth of the absence of myth’.35 Nancy expresses a nostalgic attitude 
33 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
34 Ibid., p. 46.
35 Ibid., pp. 51–52 and 59. Nancy writes: ‘It can therefore be said that romanticism, 
communism, and structuralism, through their secret but very precise community, 
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towards community when he says, ‘What makes the absence of myth a 
myth is no longer, or not directly, in any case, its communitarian character. 
On the contrary, the mythic relation to the “absence of myth” is here pre-
sented, in appearance, as an individual relation.’36 However, I would argue 
that what Nancy refers to as ‘myth of the absence of myth’ – the so-called 
collapse of ideologies that manifested itself towards end of the twentieth 
century – has not managed to put an end to the mechanism of myth, and 
certainly not to the dissemination of narratives of ancient Greece, espe-
cially regarding those Greek ‘inventions’, namely theatre and democracy.
In his essay ‘he Inoperative Community’, Nancy examines how the 
catastrophes of the twentieth century had been triggered by essentialist 
thinking applied to various types of community (nation, race, etc.) By 
referring to both Nazism and communism’s attempts to achieve solid and 
homogeneous communities, he distinguishes between a community of 
identity (immanent) and a community of identiications (inoperative). 
He maintains that the aim of an immanent community, that is ‘the goal of 
achieving a community of beings producing in essence their own essence 
as their work, and furthermore producing precisely this essence as commu-
nity’, is typical of totalitarian societies and entails a conception of ‘human 
essence’ as absolute.37 According to Nancy, such a ‘working’ community 
has never existed and is nothing but an imaginary conception. However, 
for centuries, since long before Rousseau’s Social Contract, community has 
been thought of as a lost ideal to be reconstituted, encouraging a sense of 
nostalgia and yearning for an idealized pre-modern society compared with 
the ‘harsh reality of modern experience’.38 For Nancy, community is, on 
constitute the last tradition of myth. […] But we know that we – our community, if 
it is one, our modern and postmodern humanity – have no relation to the myth of 
which we are speaking, even as we fulill it or try to fulill it. In a sense, for us all that 
remains of myth is its fulillment or its will. We no longer live in mythic life, nor in 
a time of mythic invention or speech. When we speak of “myth” or of “mythology” 
we mean the negation of something at least as much as the negation of something’.
36 Ibid, p. 59.
37 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
38 Ibid., p. 10. For a critique of Western thinking about community, including of 
Rousseau, see Roberto Esposito, Communitas: he Origin and Destiny of Community, 
trans. Timothy Campbell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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the contrary, ‘nothing other than what undoes […] the autarchy of abso-
lute immanence’; for him, the inoperative community can only produce 
an understanding of being itself as relational and plural.39 Using Bataille’s 
notion of ecstasy, Nancy conceptualizes community as the experience of 
the ‘outside’, of what constitutes the limit of human beings, namely mor-
tality.40 If community has not been lost, then loss must be thought of as 
constitutive of community, in so far as it is based on an ‘interruption of 
self-consciousness’, a shared mourning of the dead (or the ancestors, as 
incarnations of history) and a shared experience of death as somebody 
else’s, never as our own.41 As Ian James has argued, ‘it is on the basis of the 
fact that our mortality or initude is always already shared that something 
like community can exist in the irst instance’.42 Death and bereavement 
therefore enable community as a shared exposure of self-initude experi-
enced by singular beings, where the act of sharing is always problematic 
and incomplete.
Borrowing a key term from Guy Debord, Nancy expresses a concep-
tion of society as ‘spectacular’, in which the mechanisms of identiica-
tions that characterize the theatre also constitute our being-together. 
Nancy develops the idea of the plurality of being in his essay ‘Of Being 
Singular Plural’, where he describes existence as co-existence, being as 
being-together, always already a social and ‘spectacular’ experience. Nancy 
argues that the concept of ‘we’ can never signify a ‘unique subject’ but 
that it always ‘expresses a plurality’ and ‘our being divided and entangled’ 
at the same time. Being-with is the sharing of a simultaneous space-time 
that must be continuously redeined, as a ‘we’ implies the presentation 
of a here and now. A ‘we’ can only be such in a speciic way, never in a 
general way: it is deined by ‘people, culture, language, lineage, network, 
group, couple, band, and so on’. It is the ‘we’, therefore, that makes the 
‘I’ possible, since ‘no “I” can designate itself without there being a space-
time of “self-referentiality” in general’. Consequently, for Nancy, every 
39 Nancy, he Inoperative Community, p. 6.
40 Ibid., pp. 14 and 19.
41 Ibid., p. 19.
42 Ian James, he Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc 
Nancy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 180.
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time one articulates an ‘I’, one evokes performance, by positing a stage 
‘on which several [people] can say “I”, each on his own account, each in 
turn’.43 he group is ‘a stage [that serves as] a place of identiication’ while 
‘the question of the “with” can never be expressed in terms of identity, 
but rather always in terms of identiications’.44 But Nancy also warns 
against ideological exploitations of the notion of ‘we’. his is why he 
insists on the fact that a process of dis-identiication with any imposed 
‘we’ is necessary. Today, for Nancy, the problem is not so much the project 
of totalitarianism as global capitalism, with its relentless myth-making 
machines, such as the media:
We, ‘we’, how are we to say ‘we’? Or rather, who is it that says ‘we’ and what are we 
told about ourselves in the technological proliferation of the social spectacle and 
the social as spectacular, as well as in the proliferation of the self-mediatized glo-
balization and globalized mediatization? […] We do not have to identify ourselves 
as ‘we,’ as a ‘we’. Rather, we have to disidentify ourselves rom every sort of ‘we’ that 
would be the subject of its own representation, and we have to do this insofar as ‘we’ 
co-appear. Anterior to all thought, […] the ‘thought’ of ‘us’ is not a representational 
thought […]. It is, instead, a praxis and an ethos.45
Nancy’s line of thought warns against attempts to manufacture exclusions 
and foster divisions between humans through essentialist self-representa-
tions. Crucially, Nancy examines the role that Greek theatre has acquired 
in Western society as the paradigm of Western self-representation, of a 
‘we’ that is the subject of its own representation. He observes that the 
modern way of conceptualizing the foundations of the ‘so-called Western 
tradition’ includes three notions: philosophy, politics and theatre. heatre, 
as ‘the symbolic-imaginary appropriation of collective existence’, appears 
to be the quintessential ‘presentation of being-together’ (and therefore, 
of community), but it is such only insofar as it implies the distance of 
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representation.46 For Nancy, Western society still foregrounds presence 
as ‘immanent and enclosed’, while the logic of community would require 
representation as an act of sharing.47 Nancy examines the fundamental 
‘unpresentability of social Being’ which, in his view, Western society has not 
yet begun to accept. He concludes that ‘the incommensurability of Being 
as being-with-one-another’ must warn against desires to identify with the 
Greeks.48 According to Nancy, ‘we’ should therefore stop imagining that 
‘we’ are Greeks, by inally seeing ourselves as ‘moderns’ and realizing that 
‘we’, our being-together, is unpresentable.
In commenting on the ways in which social and individual identities 
are constructed through mechanisms of self-representation and identii-
cation, Nancy’s argument has considerable implications for the theatre. 
Above all, I believe, Nancy urges caution and vigilance with regard to uses 
of the ‘classical’ that unproblematically of fer themselves to their audiences 
as self-representations, saying: ‘this is where we, the people of Europe, 
come from; this is who we are’. While I do not see Nancy’s reasoning as 
discouraging contemporary performances of Greek tragedies per se, I regard 
it as a warning against essentializing mythologies about community and 
identity that are so oten uncritically attached to revivals and adaptations 
of ‘classical’ theatre.
Questions of Nationality, Transnationality and Postnationality
he myth of community, as articulated through ‘classical’ Athens in Western 
capitalist democracies, undeniably operates in conjunction with ideas about 
nation, albeit transcending the political and geographical boundaries of 
modern nation-states. Benedict Anderson’s inf luential study Imagined 




Communities deines the concept of nation as an ‘imagined political com-
munity – and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign’ and traces its 
emergence out of, and in opposition to, the disintegration of large cultural 
systems that preceded it, namely the religious community and the dynastic 
realm.49 he rise of nationalism, Anderson argues, was enabled by the syn-
ergy of printing technologies and capitalism, an alliance which he terms 
‘print-capitalism’, and the subsequent development of vernacular languages, 
which gradually overturned Latin and became of icial and administrative 
languages-of-power in their own right.50 According to Anderson, then, 
capitalism produced nation as a political and cultural category and turned 
it into one of the most inf luential paradigms for conceptualizing commu-
nity and identity. Despite recent challenges, the idea of nation retains a 
central role in the production of subjectivity.
In recent years, however, many scholars, including Zygmunt Bauman 
and Jürgen Habermas, have noted that the ideological model of the nation-
state is in decline. Bauman has argued that since the nation-state’s con-
ception of identity as ‘“natural”, predetermined and non-negotiable’ is 
no longer operative, individuals are ‘desperately seeking a “we”’ and look 
to narratives of belonging, other than nation, to underpin their identity-
making process.51 As the ‘global communities’ of the twenty-irst century 
look beyond national boundaries, transnational myths like ‘classical’ Greece 
become entangled with the process of cultural globalization, which might 
point to a future in which the nation-state loses its political dominance. 
However, because it is based on such notions as ‘origin’, the myth of ‘clas-
sical’ Greece still perpetuates ideas of ‘natural’ belonging as a model for 
identity construction, inevitably resting on the paradigm established by 
the nation-state. his would lead us to think that, in fact, the model of the 
nation-state is not in decline, but is transitioning into a new, more complex 
phase. For Habermas, however, we live in a ‘postnational world’. In his 2006 
49 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 6 and 12.
50 Ibid., see especially pp. 37–46.
51 Zygmunt Bauman and Benedetto Vecchi, Identity: Conversations with Benedetto 
Vecchi (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p. 24.
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collection of interviews and essays he Divided West, Habermas provides a 
critical analysis of the project of the European Union and its relationship 
to the United States. In his view, the problem of European identity is not 
whether such a thing exists or not, but whether European peoples will be 
able to develop a ‘shared political opinion- and will-formation […] above 
the national level’.52 Habermas believes that Europe will not be able to be 
an active player in the global arena unless it manages to build a ‘transna-
tional public space’ and a ‘political civic identity’ that is not ‘controlled 
from above’.53
In speculating on the uninished process of building a ‘consciousness 
of common political fate’, he points out that the ‘no demos thesis’ – namely, 
that there is no single ‘European subject’, and therefore that there cannot 
be any further integration among European peoples – is rooted in the 
nineteenth-century conception of the nation-state.54 He believes that the 
current underdevelopment of a shared European identity is irrelevant to 
the actual possibility of a strong European uniication project. Since the 
ictional construct of national history and mechanisms of identiication 
with the nation-state required ‘almost a century’ to become engrained in 
people’s consciousness, Habermas implies that any process of gradual iden-
tiication with European institutions might take just as long.55 Describing 
the route from a national to a postnational consciousness, he sees the new 
‘orientation to the constitution’ as an important step towards a shared 
European project.56 An outspoken supporter of the Kantian project of 
cosmopolitan citizenship, Habermas argued that the European Union’s 
transnational form of government ‘could serve as an example to be emulated 
in the postnational constellation’.57 Habermas’ idea of the end of nation and 
the beginning of a postnational age might be seen to clash with signs that 








narratives concerning ‘origin’ are still strongly operative in public-sphere 
discourses, but what is relevant about his argument is his suggestion that 
European citizens need to concentrate on building a common European 
consciousness. Amid the surge of Euroscepticism following the drating 
of the European Constitution, Habermas asks: ‘are there historical experi-
ences, traditions, and achievements capable of fostering among European 
citizens the sense of a shared political fate that they can shape in common?’58 
Habermas’ response to this fundamental question is based on his histori-
cal analysis of the ‘post-war European mentality’ and initiates a move he 
calls ‘hermeneutics of processes of self-understanding’.59 In his view, shared 
features of the European mind set, which he sees rooted in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, are the secularization of politics, dif idence towards the 
market, recognition of the contradictions of progress, scepticism towards 
technology, support for social welfare, rejection of state violence and a 
commitment to peace.60 Although these characteristics might seem to form 
Habermas’ wish list more than a real description of the alleged ‘European 
mentality’, what is crucial here is that there is no mention of the ‘classical’ 
Greco-Roman tradition in his account. For Habermas, the Old and New 
Testaments, not the Greek ‘classics’, have made Europeans what they are.
Contrary to Habermas’ thesis on postnationality, Étienne Balibar 
rejects the assumption that recent historical developments have heralded the 
so-called end of nations. In his essay ‘Homo Nationalis: An Anthropological 
Sketch of the Nation-Form’, Balibar argues that the phrase ‘end of nations’ 
actually reiterates the idea of ‘origin’, be it the origin of empires, civiliza-
tions, religions, cultures, or ‘the origin of the world’.61 In Balibar’s view, the 
discourse of the end of nations reinstates in a negative form the discourse 
of the ‘origin’ of nations, reinforcing the idea that nations have a birth-
place and that they retain an invariable relationship with it. Speciically, 
58 Ibid., italics in the original.
59 Ibid., p. 46.
60 Ibid., pp. 46–48.
61 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Ref lections on Transnational Citizenship, 
trans. James Swenson (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
p. 15.
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Balibar sees this discourse as geographically situated in the ‘North’ and 
addressed to the ‘South’ of the world, ef fectively dissuading developing 
nations from nurturing programmes of national independence, thus pro-
moting ambiguous notions of universalism and cosmopolitanism.62 In 
other words, Balibar sees this discourse as an ideological device aimed at 
maintaining international hegemony and current power relations. Whether 
a hypothetical postnational era is seen as a positive or a negative outcome, 
Balibar reminds us that the discourse of the end of nations is an ‘inversion 
[…] of the discourse individuals and groups carry on about their original 
identity and the (supposed) origins of their identity’.63 He asks how it is pos-
sible to believe in the end of nations when the regulation and bureaucracy 
of national borders and the continued ef forts to restrict the circulation of 
people across national boundaries – in other words, attempts to reaf irm 
the nation – are on the daily political agenda in the contemporary world. 
However, as Balibar points out, the positions of those who welcome an 
alleged postnational era are rooted in a complex array of ideological posi-
tions, such as neo-liberalism, globalization, international human rights, and 
environmentalism; this ambiguity prevents any categorical classiication 
of the postnational discourse as merely conservative.64
Balibar distinguishes between the notion of ‘transnational citizenship’ 
and that of ‘supranational’ or ‘postnational’ citizenship.65 He suggests that 
the process of European uniication has brought about an idea of citizenship 
that is separate from nationhood, but notes that this constitutes ‘neither a 
reproduction of the same “constitution of citizenship” […] at a supranational 
level […] nor a dissolution or the notions of “community” and “people” 
in a postnational “cosmopolitical society”’.66 Balibar’s argument on the 
transnationalization of the political sphere in Europe is signiicant in that 
it provides a framework for conceptualizing how mythologies around ‘clas-




65 Ibid., p. viii.
66 Ibid., italics in the original.
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and nationhood are divorced from each other. As a transnational European 
myth, ‘classical’ Athens provides a narrative of cultural belonging along-
side the myth of nation, while at the same time borrowing the essentialist 
mechanisms through which nationhood is constructed. Precisely when the 
European political project is seeking legitimization, the myth of ‘origin’ 
of fers a platform for the construction of a transnational European narra-
tive of belonging. What is relevant is that these mythologies work across 
regions, proposing that theatre audiences recognize themselves in ‘classi-
cal’ Athens, not on nationalist but on transnational grounds. In the late 
twentieth and early twenty-irst centuries, ‘we’ recognize ourselves in these 
myths not because they make us more British, Italian, German, French or 
Spanish, but because they are imagined as constituting the foundations of 
European civilization. Interpellating the ‘democratic’ European self, these 
mythologies transform recent conf lictual histories into common grounds 
and shared destinies.
For the purpose of this book, I will concentrate my analysis on pro-
ductions performed in Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece. 
Although these local contexts do not make for a uniied scene, today the 
international circulation of mainstream theatre in Europe, particularly 
across Western Europe, and the material circumstances which enable cer-
tain productions to secure enough funding, make it increasingly dif icult 
to link productions to speciic localities. Transnational projects casting 
performers of mixed nationalities and designed to go on tour to the various 
international institutions that have invested in the production are more 
and more common. Examples of such projects include hierry Salmon’s 
Les Troyennes (1988), Peter Stein’s Penthesilea (2002) and the European 
heatre Company’s Le Troiane (2008).67 In addition, extra-European ‘celeb-
67 hierry Salmon’s Le Troyennes was produced by French, Italian, German and Spanish 
partners. It premiered at the Orestiadi Festival of Gibellina in Sicily before going on 
a European tour to Belgium and Spain. Peter Stein’s Penthesilea, produced with an 
Italian, Austrian, Spanish and Greek cast by production partners from the same coun-
tries, opened at the ancient amphitheatre in Epidaurus and went on tour to Italy and 
Spain. he European heatre Company’s Le Troiane was directed by Annalisa Bianco 
and Virginio Liberti with an international cast in collaboration with Portuguese, 
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rity’ practitioners such as Robert Wilson and Peter Sellars have become 
so irmily associated with the theatre system in Europe that including 
their work within a commentary on performance in the region seems 
legitimate. he transnational economies of international festivals and the 
European-wide networks of State-funded theatres form an established 
part of a system that is increasingly unable and unwilling to deine internal 
boundaries.68 However, questions must be asked about the elitist mecha-
nisms enabling the emergence of touring companies and productions, which 
by no means represent the entire ecology of theatre practices in Europe. 
Despite Western Europe’s cultural and economic hegemony over ‘new’ 
European realities, processes of European transnationalization are marked 
by strong regional dif ferences and heterogeneous histories. Signiicantly, 
however, it is through Western Europe’s economic and political hegem-
ony that the ideological mechanisms of the ‘classical’ are appropriated as 
pan-European. Unsurprisingly, Europe’s leading economies and founding 
members of the European Union – Germany, France and Italy – boast 
the strongest scholarly traditions of Classical Studies in the continent.69 
French, Belgian, Spanish and Italian partners. It opened at the Napoli Teatro Festival 
and toured Italy, Spain, France, Belgium and Portugal.
68 Lev Dodin, Wajdi Mouawad and William Kentridge have also repeatedly performed 
in European venues and festivals. For a study of internationalism on the Parisian stage, 
see David Bradby and Maria M. Delgado, eds, he Paris Jigsaw: Internationalism 
and the City’s Stages (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). See also 
Maria M. Delgado and Dan Rebellato, ‘Introduction’, in Delgado and Rebellato, 
eds, Contemporary European heatre Directors (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2010), 
pp. 1–28.
69 While uses of the ‘classical’ appear to be more widespread in Western continental 
Europe, Poland and Ireland have emerged as particularly favourable contexts for the 
appropriation of Greek tragedy. his could be linked to a desire to shit national 
identity away from British, Russian or Soviet myths. For a study of adaptations of 
Greek tragedy in Ireland, see Marianne McDonald, and J. Michael Walton, Amid Our 
Troubles: Irish Versions of Greek Tragedy (London: Methuen, 2002); for for a study of 
contemporary Polish theatre, see Paul Allain, ed., ‘Polish heatre Ater 1989: Beyond 
Borders’, Contemporary heatre Review, 15.1 (2005); on Jarzyna’s and Warlikowski’s 
adaptations of the ‘classics’, see Jacek Kopciński, ‘Director’s Solos: Grzegorz Jarzyna 
and Krzysztof Warlikowski’, in ibid., 82–92.
30 Introduction
Already in 1825, Hegel could emphatically declare that ‘the name of Greece 
strikes home to the hearts of men of education in Europe’.70 But while this 
narrative emerged among the cultural elite, it only became popularized 
during the second half of the twentieth century, when divisions between 
high and low culture became increasingly blurred.
In 2003, the myth that Europe was born in ‘democratic’ Athens was 
almost of icially endorsed by the European Parliament when the Preamble 
to the drat European Constitution included a manipulated quotation from 
the Greek historian hucydides, in which the ith-century Athenian politi-
cian Pericles deines the speciicity of the Athenian political system: ‘Our 
constitution … is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of 
a minority but of the whole of the people.’71 he fact that the quotation 
was removed in the inal drat does not diminish the pervasiveness of dis-
courses that seek to legitimize a political system through its half-mythical, 
half-historical ‘origin’. Despite having permeated political discourses, these 
narratives are not, however, consistently imposed from above; they do not 
form a rational project undertaken by a consistent movement, nor are 
they mere propagandist gesture. But they do permeate all levels of society 
and are perpetuated by individuals and single works of art as much as by 
cultural institutions and the media. As a dominant cultural myth, ‘demo-
cratic’ Athens hails individuals who are produced by it and who in turn 
disseminate it in various ways, including, and perhaps most speciically, 
in the theatre. While performance remains a working site for negotiating 
70 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek 
Philosophy to Plato, trans. E. S. Haldane, 3 vols (Lincoln, NE; London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1995), I, p. 149.
71 See Luciano Canfora, Democracy in Europe: History of an Ideology (London: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2006), pp. 7–20 (pp. 7–8). A more appropriate translation of the words 
hucydides attributes to Pericles would be, according to Canfora: ‘he word we use 
to describe our political system […] is democracy because, in its administration […], it 
relates not to the few but to the majority.’ In the original Greek, neither ‘power’ nor 
‘the whole of the people’ are mentioned. See hucydides, he Peloponnesian War, 
Book II, ch. VI, par. 37.
De-Mythologizing the ‘Classical’ 31
our being-in-common, the principal challenge for those theatre-makers 
wishing to confront Greek tragedy is: how might it be possible to present 
it as other, or simultaneously familiar and foreign? How can performance 
acknowledge and subvert these mythologies?
A New ‘Wave’ of Greek Tragedies?
Part of my argument rests on the fact that a sizeable proportion of Europeans 
today happen to live within easy reach of a performance of a Greek tragedy 
at least once every theatre season. How many of them actually attend those 
performances is another matter. Translations and adaptations of Greek 
tragedy make for a signiicant part of theatre repertoires and international 
festival programmes both in state-funded and in experimental venues, sug-
gesting that Greek tragedy still manages to attract large audiences. It would 
prove dif icult to accurately demonstrate in the space of a single volume 
that the number of Greek plays staged in Europe has been increasing since 
the second half of the twentieth century. In order to prove an intensiica-
tion of the interest in Greek theatre, one would have to take into account 
the overall number of performances produced in a given period and then 
measure whether the proportion of Greek adaptations in relation to the 
entire number of productions had actually increased. However, it seems 
relevant to at least provide some form of evidence for the popularity of 
Greek tragedy. In her introduction to the volume Dionysus since 69, Edith 
Hall argues that more Greek tragedies (both translations and adaptations) 
were performed in the last three decades of the twentieth century ‘than 
at any other point in history since Greco-Roman antiquity’.72 She notes 
that a large number of new productions of Greek tragedies for commercial 
72 Edith Hall, ‘Introduction’, in Edith Hall, Fiona Macintosh and Amanda Wrigley, 
eds, Dionysus since 69: Greek Tragedy at the Dawn of the hird Millennium (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1–46 (p. 2).
